Safety at What Cost? Why El Salvador Loves Nayib Bukele Despite His Authoritarian Turn
Introduction
Maritza Pacheco, a 44-year-old mother from a poor neighborhood in San Salvador, endured years of terror under gang rule. Warring gangs – MS-13 and Barrio 18 – turned her community into a battleground, with gunfire often ripping through the flimsy tin roofs of homes and gang members extorting residents like her for “protection” money. Pacheco’s family lived in constant panic, rarely venturing outside. Desperate to keep her children safe, she even paid smugglers to take her teenage son (and his sister) to the United States in early 2022 – a heartbreaking decision forced by gang threats closing in on her boy. Before long, the family’s small produce stand had to operate in secret to avoid paying gang “rent,” and simple freedoms like walking at night or receiving a pizza delivery were unthinkable.
In March 2022, President Nayib Bukele launched a “state of exception” – an unprecedented anti-gang crackdown suspending certain rights – and El Salvador underwent a dramatic transformation. Over 65,000 suspected gang members were rounded up and thrown into new mega-prisons, virtually eradicating the gang presence on the streets. For Pacheco, these changes felt like “a small miracle.” No longer do tattooed enforcers come to demand payments; she and her daughter no longer have to hide their livelihood. In fact, for the first time, delivery drivers and fruit vendors feel safe entering her neighborhood, and even banks have returned – one bank gave Pacheco a microloan to open a modest corner store beside her home. Now she proudly sells candies, sodas and pastries to her neighbors late into the night, something unimaginable a couple of years ago. “People come and stay sometimes until 12 or 1 in the morning,” Pacheco marvels, noting that “it’s so safe that we can stay open”.
The newfound security has changed more than just Pacheco’s daily routine – it’s changed her outlook on her country’s leadership. When asked about President Bukele, Pacheco admits she had never voted in her life before. “Now, I would vote for him,” she says gratefully. Her story is far from unique. Freed from gang tyranny, countless Salvadorans have similarly reclaimed their neighborhoods and livelihoods, fueling sky-high public support for Bukele’s hardline policies. In fact, a survey in early 2023 found 92% of Salvadorans backed the state of exception crackdown, reflecting the overwhelming popular approval for the peace and hope it restored.
El Salvador’s President, Nayib Bukele, has achieved an exceptional level of domestic popularity, even as his tenure has drawn intense international scrutiny. In office since 2019, Bukele consistently enjoys approval ratings[U1] between 75% and 90+%, making him one of the world’s most popular heads of state. This popularity endures despite – or perhaps partly because of – his aggressive “mano dura” (iron fist) policies. Under Bukele’s leadership, El Salvador has seen dramatic changes: a plunge in violent crime, an ambitious (if controversial) economic agenda (including adopting Bitcoin as legal tender), and a ruling style that many observers label authoritarian due to mass arrests, suspended civil liberties, and the weakening of democratic checks and balances. This report examines why Bukele remains so popular in El Salvador, analyzing public opinion data, domestic policy outcomes on crime and the economy, his abuse of civil rights, and the role of his tough-on-crime image in sustaining support.
Public Opinion and Approval Ratings
The first many Americans have heard of Bukele might have been his meeting with Trump today, but back home, Bukele’s approval ratings have been extraordinarily high throughout his presidency. Multiple surveys by local and international pollsters indicate overwhelming support for his administration’s performance. For instance, a CID Gallup survey in early 2023 found 92% of Salvadorans supported the Bukele government’s actions under the state of emergency. Other polls routinely place his job approval in the 80–90% range, far above any recent predecessor. Even four years into his term, Bukele led preference polls by a huge margin. In early 2024, as he sought re-election, one university poll showed him with a 71-point lead over his nearest rival (Bukele polling around the mid-70s percent, while opposition candidates were in the low single digits). This dominance translated into a landslide victory in the February 2024 election, where Bukele won roughly 83% of the vote (amid about 50% turnout). Such levels of support make Bukele not only the most popular Salvadoran leader in modern history, but a standout in Latin America – recent comparisons showed him topping regional approval rankings by a wide margin.
Several factors explain Bukele’s broad appeal in opinion polls. First, public trust in traditional parties (the former leftist FMLN and right-wing ARENA) had collapsed due to decades of corruption scandals and failure to tame crime. Bukele, a young outsider, capitalized on this resentment and promised a break from the past. Second, his administration’s relentless focus on improving security addressed the top concern of most Salvadorans. Surveys indicate that as crime has fallen, citizens feel safer and continue to reward Bukele with positive ratings. Third, Bukele’s media and marketing savvy helps shape public perception. He is a prolific user of social media and state communications to highlight successes – controlling the narrative in a way that keeps his image positive domestically. Detractors note that independent media in El Salvador have been harassed and discredited by his government, but many Salvadorans view critical press with skepticism, limiting the impact of negative coverage. Lastly, personal style plays a role: Bukele’s charismatic, bold persona (he once jokingly called himself the “world’s coolest dictator”) and his defiance of “elite” international opinion resonate with parts of the population that feel pride in having a strong leader on the world stage. In sum, opinion polls reflect a populace that – for now – overwhelmingly credits Bukele for delivering tangible improvements in their daily lives and is willing to overlook or justify the controversial aspects of his rule.
Security Crackdown and Crime Reduction
By far the biggest driver of Bukele’s popularity is the perception of improved security. El Salvador was long infamous for its sky-high rates of gang violence, homicide, and extortion, which made daily life perilous for many citizens. Bukele vowed to end this gang terror, and his government’s heavy-handed crackdown has indeed coincided with an unprecedented drop in crime. Since March 2022, El Salvador has been under a “state of exception” (state of emergency) that suspends certain constitutional rights and grants security forces broad powers to combat gangs. This policy, part of Bukele’s “War on Gangs,” has led to the mass incarceration of alleged gang members on an astonishing scale. As of early 2024, authorities had arrested more than 75,000 people (over 1% of the population) on suspicion of gang ties, often without formal charges. This dragnet pushed the country’s prison population to the highest incarceration rate in the world (nearly 2% of adults behind bars) and prompted the construction of a new 40,000-capacity “mega-prison” to hold the influx of inmates.
Suspected gang members in El Salvador’s new mega-prison, which was built to house tens of thousands of detainees in the government’s sweeping crackdown on violent crime. Bukele’s hardline approach has dramatically reduced street gang activity, a result that many Salvadorans credit for improving daily security.[U2]
The results of these hardline measures have been dramatic, according to official statistics. El Salvador’s homicide rate has plummeted to its lowest level on record. When Bukele took office in 2019, the country was averaging 6.5 murders per day (a rate of about 36 homicides per 100,000 people – one of the worst in the world). By 2022, after the anti-gang offensive began, the homicide rate had fallen by 57% in a single year, dropping to 495 murders (around 8 per 100,000) from 1,147 the year before. This is on par with the murder rate in the U.S. The downward trend continued through 2023 and 2024; government data claim the murder rate in 2024 was roughly 1.9 per 100,000 – making it by far the safest year in El Salvador’s modern history. For context, a decade earlier, El Salvador’s murder rate exceeded 100 per 100,000 (at one point earning the grim title of murder capital of the world). Now it is nearing levels comparable to some European countries. Similarly, other crimes linked to gangs have abated. Extortion payments, which gangs routinely extracted from businesses and residents (“rentas”), have “plummeted” by government accounts. The transport minister estimated that within months of the crackdown, bus companies had saved $50 million that would have gone to gangs in extortion fees. Many Salvadorans who for years paid war taxes to gangsters – under threat of death – report that these threats have vanished seemingly overnight. Such improvements have had a palpable impact on ordinary people’s sense of safety and economic relief. “El Salvador went from being the most unsafe country to the safest,” Bukele proclaimed, albeit with some hyperbole. While that claim might be debatable, there is no doubt that fear of gang violence has receded significantly inside El Salvador.
Crucially, Salvadorans largely credit Bukele’s policies for this turnaround, reinforcing his popularity. The state of exception and mass arrests, though harsh, are extremely popular at home. A February 2023 poll showed 92% of respondents approved of the emergency crackdown and the “hardline” tactics that came with it. In other words, the public has overwhelmingly accepted the trade-off of civil liberties for security gains. Many citizens say they finally feel safe to walk the streets, open businesses, or ride the bus without fear – a stark change from prior years. Even some who acknowledge innocent people have been caught up in the sweeps express that it’s a price worth paying for peace. Bukele has explicitly built his legitimacy on this success: his re-election campaign in 2024 centered on the slogan that the crackdown delivered “irrefutable” results[U3] , and voters responded by “casting aside concerns about erosion of democracy to reward him for a fierce gang crackdown” at the polls. In rallies, crowds of supporters cheer his promises to keep locking up “terrorists” until all gangs are eliminated. In sum, the dramatic drop in crime under Bukele’s tenure is the single biggest factor sustaining his sky-high approval. The perception (carefully cultivated by the government) is that Bukele rescued the country from near lawlessness – a narrative that resonates deeply with a population that endured decades of gang terror.
However, important caveats: Independent observers note that not all the security gains can be transparently verified, and that Bukele’s strategy may have involved hidden arrangements. Investigative reports (e.g. by the newspaper El Faro) and the U.S. government have alleged that earlier in his term, Bukele’s administration brokered a secret truce with gang leaders – essentially trading prisoner perks and financial incentives for a drop in homicides. Bukele has repeatedly denied any such “pact”. Regardless, when that alleged ceasefire fell apart in March 2022 (triggering a spike in killings), Bukele unleashed the current crackdown. The resulting peace is thus viewed by some analysts as fragile or artificially achieved, raising questions about its sustainability. There are also concerns that the official crime figures lack transparency – for example, security forces may be classifying some deaths differently or not reporting certain abuses. Despite these questions, it remains true that visible violence on the streets has sharply decreased, and for most Salvadorans that reality is sufficient proof of success. In the public mind, Bukele delivered where past governments failed: he took on the gangs head-on, and people can feel the difference. This earned him gratitude and loyalty that largely outweighs the doubts, at least in the short term.
Economic and Social Policy Outcomes
Beyond security, Bukele’s record on the economy and social development is more mixed – yet interestingly, this has not significantly dented his popularity. El Salvador’s economy has seen modest growth and some notable initiatives under Bukele, but also faces persistent challenges like poverty, high public debt, and an unorthodox national cryptocurrency experiment. Public opinion suggests that for now, Salvadorans are willing to give Bukele a pass on economic shortcomings, as the issue of crime had overshadowed other concerns until recently. Still, as the country stabilizes security-wise, more attention is turning to bread-and-butter issues, and Bukele’s economic management will be a key test of his sustained popularity going forward.
On the positive side, the improved security climate itself has economic benefits. Businesses, large and small, are no longer crippled by extortion payments, and investor confidence has ticked up now that the threat of gang violence is lower. For example, foreign direct investment (FDI), which was long anemic in El Salvador, showed some improvement during Bukele’s first term (nearly $500 million in the first three quarters of 2023, up from a net outflow in 2022). While FDI was still below pre-2019 levels, the government touted new investments in sectors like tourism and manufacturing. Indeed, tourism has surged, with El Salvador reportedly ranking among the fastest-growing destinations in 2023 – visitor numbers were up 40% from 2019 – a boom the government attributes to the country’s newfound reputation for safety and specific promotions like Bukele’s “Surf City” beach development project. Unemployment has also edged down slightly (by about 1% since 2019). Bukele implemented various infrastructure and social initiatives: his administration built new roads and a large public library, expanded internet access (distributing tablets to students and bringing Google Classroom to all public schools), and opened a public veterinary hospital (funded in part by cryptocurrency reserves). During the COVID-19 pandemic, the government delivered food packages to vulnerable households and quickly enforced lockdowns, measures that many appreciated during the crisis. These domestic policy outcomes – while less headline-grabbing than the gang war – have helped Bukele craft an image of a forward-looking, “innovative” leader (as his supporters often describe him). His push to adopt Bitcoin as legal tender in 2021, for example, was framed as a bold economic modernization step to boost financial inclusion and foreign investment. (Over 70% of Salvadorans lacked bank accounts; Bukele argued that using cryptocurrency could bring the unbanked into the economy and reduce remittance fees.) Internationally, this Bitcoin experiment made him famous – or infamous – in tech and finance circles, adding to his populist appeal at home as someone willing to break the mold.
Despite these efforts, El Salvador’s economy remains fragile, and many social indicators have stagnated or worsened. The Bitcoin law itself had limited uptake – surveys indicate around 90% of Salvadorans never really used Bitcoin, and less than 2% of remittances (a vital income source) have been sent via cryptocurrency. Meanwhile, the government’s direct crypto investments lost value when Bitcoin’s price fell, and planned “Bitcoin bonds” to raise funds never fully materialized, leading critics to call the project a costly stunt. Bukele ended up negotiating a $1.4 billion loan from the IMF in late 2024 to shore up finances, and reportedly agreed to make Bitcoin use voluntary rather than mandatory as part of the deal. High public debt (over [U4] 80% of GDP) and fiscal deficits have constrained his ability to pour money into social programs. In fact, early in his term, Bukele was criticized for cutting funding to traditional social programs while increasing the security budget. Poverty rates have not improved under his presidency; in 2019 about 23% of households were below the poverty line, and by recent estimates that has risen to roughly 27% (extreme poverty saw a particularly alarming increase during the pandemic years). Economic growth, which hit a strong rebound of 10% in 2021 after the pandemic slump, has since cooled off to modest levels. The IMF projects growth of only ~2% for 2024, roughly the same or lower than pre-Bukele years. Inflation has been moderate (2–3%), thanks in part to El Salvador’s use of the US dollar, but cost of living is still a challenge – the basic food basket cost for a family is around $250/month, significant in a country where the minimum wage[U5] averages around $300. Inequality and underemployment remain entrenched issues that Bukele’s government has not decisively tackled.
Notably, these socio-economic shortcomings have not turned the public against Bukele – at least not yet. Opinion polls suggest that the priority of concerns has shifted: with violent crime receding, Salvadorans now cite the economy as the country’s biggest problem (about 70% do, in one survey). But importantly, many still trust Bukele to handle it. The lack of viable opposition alternatives plays a role here. Bukele’s political dominance (his party controls the legislature and nearly all municipalities) means few credible voices are highlighting economic failures in a way that resonates. Furthermore, the palpable improvements in security and public order have created a sense of optimism that “if he fixed the gang problem, he can fix the economy next.”[U6] As one analyst noted, “pocketbook issues don’t seem to have taken much of a bite out of Bukele’s massive support” so far. There is a honeymoon effect where people are giving him time to deliver on jobs and poverty, buoyed by the goodwill earned from making neighborhoods safer. In his campaign for a new term, Bukele promised that the next five years would bring a focus on “economic transformation” now that the gang war is won. Whether he succeeds or not, his current popularity owes relatively little to economic gains (since those have been modest) and much more to the security narrative. Social programs and economic performance have, to date, been secondary in explaining his enduring approval, though that could change if economic discontent grows.
Civil Rights Violations and Democratic Backsliding
While Bukele is celebrated by many at home for restoring order, he is widely criticized abroad for the authoritarian methods used to achieve it. Under Bukele’s rule, El Salvador has experienced a marked erosion of democratic institutions and civil liberties, raising alarms from human rights organizations, the United States, and others in the international community. A candid assessment of Bukele’s tenure must grapple with these troubling developments, even if they have not yet significantly eroded his popular support internally. Key concerns include mass arbitrary detentions, suspension of due process, abuses in custody, muzzling of independent media, and the concentration of power by dismantling institutional checks (e.g. the judiciary and constitutional limits on re-election).
State of Exception & Mass Arrests: Since March 2022, El Salvador’s state of exception has been renewed month after month, creating what Amnesty International called an “alarming regression” in human rights. Under the emergency regime, basic rights are suspended – police and soldiers can arrest people without warrants, authorities can intercept private communications at will, detainees can be held without access to lawyers or courts for extended periods, and prosecutors can mass-charge individuals collectively. Over 75,000 people have been rounded up in anti-gang raids, often on tenuous evidence such as a tattoo, anonymous tip, or simply living in a gang-dominated neighborhood. Due process has effectively been gutted: most detainees were not formally charged or given a chance to defend themselves for months on end. Critics say thousands of innocent people – including children as young as 12, community leaders, and random citizens with no gang ties – have been swept into prison unfairly. In many cases, families do not know where their loved one is being held or why they were arrested. By late 2023, at least 189 detainees had died in custody under the state of emergency, with reports of torture or denial of medical care in overcrowded prisons. Rather than investigate these deaths, the Attorney General’s office (now firmly pro-Bukele) closed the cases without accountability. Independent media and NGOs have documented harrowing stories of wrongful detentions and abuse. For example, Human Rights Watch reported “massive human rights violations” including torture and deaths in custody, describing the government’s campaign as “reducing gang violence by replacing it with state violence.”
Bukele’s response to these criticisms has been defiant. He argues that extraordinary measures are justified by the extraordinary threat gangs posed. In a September 2023 speech at the UN, Bukele explicitly rejected the “external” criticism over human rights, claiming that without his hardline tactics El Salvador would still be the murder capital of the world. “The debate is over – we made the right decisions, and now we are a model of security,” he told the General Assembly. Domestically, Bukele’s government often dismisses human rights complaints by suggesting that those who raise them care more about criminals than victims. This rhetoric, combined with strict control over state institutions, has meant little to no legal pushback inside El Salvador against the mass arrests. The courts have largely ceased acting as a check on executive power during the emergency. In fact, Bukele’s allies passed special laws to facilitate the crackdown – allowing for collective trials, lowering the age of criminal responsibility to 12 for gang offenses, and broadening the definition of “terrorism” to include gang membership. These moves fundamentally weaken the rule of law and have transformed El Salvador’s justice system into one geared for repression over rights. International observers warn that such suspension of the rule of law cannot be permanent without dire consequences for democracy – yet as of 2025, the state of exception has been renewed numerous times (over 20 extensions) and shows no sign of being lifted.
Weakening of Democratic Institutions: Bukele has also been criticized for systematically undermining democratic checks and balances to concentrate power in his own hands. The most blatant example occurred in May 2021, when Bukele’s party took control of the Legislative Assembly. In their very first session, pro-Bukele lawmakers voted to remove all five magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber (the top court), as well as the Attorney General, and replace them with loyalists. This purge of the judiciary was widely condemned (the opposition and U.S. officials called it a “dangerous power grab”). Essentially, Bukele eliminated the highest legal check on his power – the ousted judges were among the few remaining institutions that could restrain him. With a compliant court in place, Bukele later received judicial blessing for previously unconstitutional moves. As previously reported, in 2021, his new Constitutional Chamber reinterpreted the constitution to allow Bukele to run for a consecutive second term, despite an explicit constitutional ban on re-election. This controversial ruling [U7] opened the door for his 2024 candidacy. Likewise, election rules and legislative districts have been reshuffled in ways that favor Bukele’s party. With his coalition now controlling nearly 90% of the legislature after 2024’s vote, Bukele has near-total governing power. He can amend the constitution (raising speculation he may seek to eliminate term limits entirely), and there are few if any institutional veto points left. The independence of the press and civil society has also been under pressure – prominent investigative outlets like El Faro faced government audits and accusations, some journalists fled the country fearing prosecution, and a new law on “foreign agents” threatened to choke off funding for NGOs critical of the government. This pattern of democratic backsliding has led observers to label Bukele a “popular autocrat” or even a “dictator in the making.” For example, The Journal of Democracy dubbed him “the world’s most popular dictator,” noting that he retains public adoration while aggressively dismantling democratic institutions.
From a human rights perspective, Bukele’s tenure has been a grim period in El Salvador. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations and others have all condemned the mass detention campaign and the intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and activists. In a 2023 report, Amnesty said El Salvador was experiencing a “deepening human rights crisis,” citing thousands of arbitrary detentions and dozens of in-custody deaths. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern that the state of emergency had “enabled mass violations”, and urged restoring due process. The United States government, while cooperating with El Salvador on some security and migration issues, has sanctioned a few Salvadoran officials over corruption and civil rights abuses, and U.S. diplomats have publicly cautioned Bukele about weakening democracy. In one instance, a senior White House advisor tweeted at Bukele, “This is not what you do,” in reaction to the 2021 judge purge. Bukele typically brushes off such criticism or even turns it to his advantage domestically by casting himself as a defiant nationalist resisting foreign meddling. Indeed, many Salvadorans, fed up with years of violence and corruption under democratic pretenses, are not highly sensitive to these institutional concerns. Polls at the time showed majority support for the removal of the old Supreme Court judges, for example, as people perceived the courts to have protected gangsters and corrupt politicians in the past. Thus, Bukele’s dismantling of checks and balances, while alarming to democracy watchdogs, did not produce mass outrage at home – in fact, it was met with applause by his base.
In summary, Bukele’s rule has undeniably trampled over civil liberties and liberal democratic norms in El Salvador. The country is under a quasi-permanent state of emergency, tens of thousands languish in prison without trial, the independence of the judiciary and other institutions has been severely compromised, and Bukele now wields unchecked power. These are the very real costs of the peace and stability he has delivered. The key question, then, is how these violations reconcile with – or possibly even reinforce – his domestic popularity.
Popularity: Despite or Because of His Tough-on-Crime Stance?
A central paradox of Bukele’s rule is that his popularity persists despite actions normally expected to be unpopular in a democracy – mass arrests without trial, censorship of critics, extending his own power – yet in the Salvadoran context, these very actions have enhanced his standing. The evidence suggests that Bukele’s “strongman” approach is not merely tolerated by the public but is a key part of his appeal to many citizens who were desperate for relief from chaos.
It would be inaccurate to say Salvadorans simply ignore the reports of abuses; rather, a large portion of the public either does not believe those reports apply to innocent people or does not prioritize those concerns over the tangible improvement in security. For decades, people in El Salvador lived under the terror of gangs with no reprieve – extortion, murders, and territorial control by criminal groups were a daily reality. Governments before Bukele oscillated between corrupt deals with gangs and half-hearted crackdowns, neither of which brought lasting peace. By 2018–2019, frustration and fear had peaked. Bukele’s iron-fist policy, while extreme, broke that cycle in a way people can feel. Many Salvadorans view the mass incarceration of gang members as necessary justice – a long overdue retribution against those who made their lives hell. The fact that 1% of the population is now behind bars is seen not as a sign of state overreach, but of finally putting “the bad guys” away. In the public narrative, Bukele swapped chaos for order. Thus, measures that outsiders label repressive are framed internally as restoring freedom (freedom from fear of gangs). This goes a long way toward explaining why his popularity is bolstered by the crackdowns. Indeed, when asked, huge majorities consistently voice support for continuing the state of exception and even expanding tough measures. Bukele’s tough-on-crime image — patrolling in tactical gear, sending selfies from the prison control room, and tweeting that gang members “will never terrorize us again” — is central to his persona and is embraced by supporters.
At the same time, it’s fair to say some segment of Bukele’s popularity persists despite the authoritarian aspects. Not everyone who approves of Bukele necessarily likes the suspension of due process – some may simply feel it doesn’t affect them personally, or that it’s a temporary emergency. There are Salvadorans who admire Bukele’s results but quietly harbor worries about the long-term damage to institutions. For now, however, these concerns are largely muted or overridden by the immediate sense of security. The 2024 election was telling: voters explicitly “cast aside concerns about erosion of democracy” to reward Bukele for the security gains. Essentially, they made a collective choice that the ends justified the means. Bukele pitched the election as a referendum on his governance, and he framed it as “security vs. chaos” – a winning formula when the vast majority feel safer than they ever remember.
There is also an element of trust in Bukele personally that plays a role. Many Salvadorans feel that, unlike past rulers who were corrupt or self-interested, Bukele genuinely has the people’s interests at heart – even if he’s rough in implementing policies. This personal trust can lead to a belief that “he’ll fix the rough edges later” or that abuses are anomalies rather than a deliberate feature. Bukele’s constant refrain is that everything he does is to improve the country, and after seeing murder rates plunge, a large portion of the public is inclined to believe him or at least give him the benefit of the doubt. In other words, they see the mass arrests and institutional changes as tough medicine needed to cure an existential threat. Those who lost family members to gang violence, for example, often say Bukele is the first leader who made them feel justice was served. Conversely, victims of state abuse (families of wrongly detained individuals) remain a minority voice with little platform, so their plight doesn’t gain broad traction to undercut Bukele’s popularity.
In summary, Bukele’s popularity is both despite and because of his hardline methods. It persists despite clear violations of liberal democratic norms because a critical mass of Salvadorans prioritizes safety, stability, and a break from the past over abstract principles of procedure or international approval. Simultaneously, his popularity is enhanced by the tough-on-crime image, as it projects strength and decisiveness that many find reassuring after years of insecurity. As Reuters aptly noted, Salvadoran voters in 2024 were willing to overlook Bukele’s authoritarianism and “reward him for a fierce gang crackdown that transformed security in the country”. The trade-off of security for some freedoms – often a devil’s bargain in other contexts – is broadly accepted in El Salvador today, which explains why Bukele remains immensely popular at home even as critics decry his tactics. Whether this popularity endures in the longer term (for instance, if economic frustrations grow or if the absence of opposition leads to new problems) is an open question. But as of now, Bukele embodies a rare phenomenon: a leader whose democratic legitimacy has been reinforced, not undermined, by his authoritarian style, at least in the eyes of his own people.
Conclusion
President Nayib Bukele’s enduring popularity in El Salvador can be attributed to a confluence of factors: unprecedented improvements in public security, savvy populist politics, and a populace exhausted by years of violence and corruption. Public opinion data and the 2024 election results make clear that Salvadorans overwhelmingly approve of Bukele’s results – if not always the methods – especially the crackdown that has dramatically reduced gang crime. Domestically, many view him as a transformative figure who rescued the country from terror and inept leadership, thereby earning their trust and even adulation. Internationally, however, Bukele is a polarizing figure, hailed by some as an effective crime-fighter but condemned by others for dismantling democratic institutions and violating human rights. His government’s record includes serious civil rights abuses: tens of thousands jailed without due process, a cowed judiciary and press, and constitutional norms bent to his will. So far, these authoritarian tendencies have not eroded his domestic support; on the contrary, his strongman image – the tough, take-charge leader – resonates in a society that craved order. In the eyes of his supporters, Bukele delivered peace and pride to El Salvador, and if that meant bruising democracy, it was a price they were willing to pay.
In conclusion, Bukele remains highly popular because he addressed the public’s core demands (safety and a break from the old corrupt politics) in a direct, if heavy-handed, way. His domestic policy outcomes on crime are seen as a remarkable success, overshadowing middling performance on the economy or social welfare. Public opinion reflects a calculation that life has improved under Bukele – fewer murders, less extortion, more hope – and thus he has earned continued support. Meanwhile, the international perspective serves as a warning: El Salvador’s peace has come at the expense of liberal democracy, raising the question of how sustainable this model can be. For now, Bukele’s popularity shows little sign of waning. It is a popularity built on the paradox of an authoritarian cure to a societal ill – a cure that most Salvadorans, having lived through the illness of rampant crime, are still grateful for. The Bukele phenomenon illustrates how, in certain contexts, the promise of security and order can galvanize democratic support for an undemocratic style of governance. Whether that bargain will hold as El Salvador moves forward – and what it means for the country’s democracy in the long run – remains a pivotal storyline to watch.
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