Authoritarian Rule: Economic Boon or Bane for National Economies?
Article 3 for Authoritarian week
Read the other authoritarian week topics: The end of the Roman Republic—no parallels here, Iran and US relations
Throwback article: The world’s coolest dictator?
Introduction
Authoritarian regimes are typically defined by centralized power, constrained political freedoms, and limited civil liberties. While their political power is problematic for the citizens of authoritarian countries, the economic consequences of authoritarian rule are more nuanced. This article explores how such regimes influence national economies and whether they ultimately hinder or promote economic development. We look at cases where authoritarianism led to negative outcomes – from the Soviet Union’s stagnation to Venezuela’s collapse – as well as instances where authoritarian rule coincided with strong growth, such as China’s boom and Singapore’s rise. We also explore “edge cases” like South Korea and Portugal, where autocratic periods laid economic foundations later built upon by democracies. All data and claims are sourced from reputable institutions (IMF, World Bank, OECD) to ensure an evidence-based analysis.
Authoritarianism and Economic Decline
Soviet Union and Russia: Centralized Control and Stagnation
The Soviet Union’s centrally planned economy initially industrialized rapidly, but by the late 20th century it was straining under authoritarian mismanagement. In the 1980s, Soviet GDP growth plummeted – averaging just 2.9% annually from 1986–1990, down from 4.7% in the early 1980s. Shortages became common, and for the first time the regime acknowledged poverty: by 1989 an estimated 14% of Soviets were living below the poverty line, whereas the official figure had been 0% in 1980. Lacking the accountability to correct course, the one-party state proved ill-equipped to reform itself, and the USSR’s economic decline culminated in its 1991 collapse.
Post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s suffered a severe contraction during its chaotic transition from communism. By the time Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian leadership took hold in the 2000s, rising oil prices fueled a rebound – Russia’s GDP grew nearly 7% a year from 1999 through the early 2000s. However, rather than using this windfall for broad-based development, the Putin government became increasingly repressive and corrupt, stalling reforms. High oil revenues “became a license” for Putin to entrench authoritarian control and cronyism, without delivering commensurate economic diversification. Indeed, despite the commodities boom, Russia’s growth under Putin was not exceptional – by one analysis, its growth rate ranked only 12th out of 15 former Soviet republics since 1999. Key economic institutions have been weakened by political interference; for example, renationalization and weak rule of law have hurt investor confidence. Russia’s authoritarian model has also proven vulnerable to shocks: after 2014, Western sanctions and falling oil prices led to stagnation, and inflation surged into double digits. In short, the Soviet/Russian experience suggests that tightly centralized authority can impede the adaptability and transparency needed for sustained growth, resulting in long-term stagnation despite periods of short-term gains.
North Korea: Isolation and Persistent Poverty
North Korea offers one of the starkest examples of authoritarian economic failure. The Kim dynasty’s totalitarian rule has maintained a state-run, isolationist economy for decades, with disastrous results for living standards. Reliable data are scarce, but estimates indicate North Korea’s GDP per capita is only about $1,200 (nominal) as of 2023 – placing it among the poorest countries. In the mid-20th century, North Korea was on par economically with South Korea, but while the South embraced markets and development, the North’s economy stagnated. Today, a majority of North Koreans live in extreme poverty: a recent study using novel satellite data estimated around 60% of the population was in poverty as of 2018. Chronic food shortages and periodic famines have plagued the country; the devastating famine in the 1990s killed hundreds of thousands, underscoring the regime’s inability to provide basic sustenance.
Authoritarian political control has directly shaped these outcomes. The regime’s “Juche” ideology of self-reliance has led to very limited trade and foreign investment. Even when North Korea has attempted to create Special Economic Zones to attract capital, investors have largely stayed away due to poor infrastructure, excessive bureaucracy, and uncertainty over property rights. Virtually all resources are directed by the ruling elite, with priority given to the military (a “songun” or military-first policy) at the expense of civilian needs. This means that in times of crisis – such as crop failures or international sanctions – the government lacks both the flexibility and foreign reserves to respond effectively. Political decisions, like refusing economic reforms or external aid for fear of losing grip on power, have left the economy extremely fragile. The result is an isolated command economy characterized by negligible growth, persistent inflation in basic goods, and a population cut off from the improvements in welfare seen in most of East Asia. North Korea’s experience illustrates how extreme authoritarianism and autarky can trap a nation in poverty and privation, with GDP growth near zero and minimal resilience to shocks.
Venezuela: Autocratic Populism and Economic Collapse
Few economies have imploded as dramatically as Venezuela’s in the past decade, as the country’s experiment in authoritarian socialism unraveled. Once one of Latin America’s wealthiest nations, Venezuela under the regimes of Hugo Chávez and his successor Nicolás Maduro saw a steep descent into crisis. After years of state controls, expropriations, and fiscal mismanagement, Venezuela’s GDP collapsed by over 75% between 2013 and 2021 – the largest economic decline ever recorded in a nation not beset by war. This effectively wiped out decades of growth, bringing output down to a fraction of its previous level. Unemployment soared and industries ground to a halt; oil production (the country’s lifeline) plummeted as the state-run oil company PDVSA was hollowed out by politicization and mismanagement. Hyperinflation began in 2017, destroying the currency’s value – at one point in 2018, prices were doubling every few weeks, and the annual inflation rate topped well over 100,000%, rendering the Bolívar nearly worthless. By 2020, an estimated 95% of Venezuelans were living below the poverty line, and millions had fled the country in search of basic survival.
The root of this disaster lies in how authoritarian political control skewed economic decision-making. During the oil boom of the 2000s, Chávez centralized power and spent lavishly on social programs and patronage, while discouraging private enterprise. Little was saved for a rainy day; instead, the regime printed money to cover deficits, sowing the seeds of inflation. Independent institutions that might have checked reckless policies – an autonomous central bank, free press, or legislature – were steadily neutered. When oil prices crashed in 2014, Venezuela had no buffers. Rather than enact corrective measures, the Maduro government doubled down on populist controls: imposing rigid price caps (which led to empty store shelves), fixing an unrealistic currency rate, and refusing international aid or IMF assistance due to political paranoia. With dissent silenced and no electoral accountability, the regime chose policies that protected its hold on power but annihilated the economy.
Investment, both domestic and foreign, fled Venezuela amid property seizures and legal insecurity. Foreign direct investment turned deeply negative as companies pulled out. The human impact has been devastating – shortages of food and medicine, a return of previously eradicated diseases, and widespread malnutrition. It took belated partial reforms (like dollarizing the economy informally and easing price controls) in 2019–2021 to finally slow the hyperinflation and produce a small economic uptick. But even with modest growth resuming in 2022, Venezuela remains a shadow of its former self. The Venezuelan case starkly illustrates how authoritarian governance, especially when combined with populist economic policies, can lead to utter economic collapse. Lack of checks and balances allowed grave policy errors to compound, and resilience to crisis was nonexistent – the country plunged from prosperity to humanitarian emergency under the weight of its government’s misrule.
Authoritarianism and Rapid Growth
China: One-Party Rule and an Economic Miracle
China is often cited as proof that authoritarianism can deliver blistering economic growth. Since the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping’s Communist Party regime began market-oriented reforms, China’s one-party state has presided over an economic miracle unprecedented in scale. According GDP growth averaged over 9% per year from 1978 onward, propelling China from a poor agrarian nation to the world’s second-largest economy. In real terms, China’s GDP has expanded significantly, with hundreds of millions entering the middle class. Most strikingly, this growth has been a powerful engine for poverty reduction. Over the past 40 years, around 800 million Chinese citizens have lifted themselves out of extreme poverty (living on less than $1.90 a day) – accounting for the vast majority of global poverty reduction in that time. By 2020, China declared that it had essentially eliminated extreme poverty nationwide, an achievement confirmed by World Bank data showing extreme poverty at near zero. Other social indicators improved as well: literacy became virtually universal, life expectancy rose to 79 years, and infrastructure like highways and high-speed rail now rivals or exceeds that of many high-income countries.
How did an authoritarian system facilitate this success? Beijing’s leaders credit the stability and long-term planning enabled by one-party rule. The government was able to launch sweeping economic reforms – such as decollectivizing agriculture, opening special economic zones for foreign investment, and later joining the World Trade Organization – without facing partisan gridlock. They could also enforce tough policies, such as limiting population growth through the now-ended one-child policy, and invest heavily in infrastructure and education with little political resistance. The state directed massive savings into investment – China’s investment-to-GDP ratio often exceeded 40%, one of the highest in the world – building the factories, roads, and power plants that fueled growth. Centralized control also allowed China to respond quickly to crises: for instance, during the 2008 global financial meltdown, the government unleashed a stimulus package of about 13% of GDP, which kept the economy growing almost 9% in 2009 while much of the world contracted. Investors generally found the environment attractive due to political stability and pro-business policies (despite the lack of democracy, China aggressively courted foreign direct investment and technology). Annual FDI inflows into China rose from negligible levels in the 1980s to over $150 billion in recent years, making it one of the top destinations globally.
However, China’s model also underscores that authoritarian growth comes with caveats. The impressive headline numbers have been accompanied by rising inequality (China’s Gini coefficient climbed sharply in the reform era), endemic local corruption, and heavy environmental damage from unbridled industrial expansion. Without democratic checks, China experienced episodes of overspending and debt build-up – local governments amassed trillions in off-balance-sheet debt after 2008, and inefficient state-owned enterprises continue to dominate key sectors. Yet the central government has shown capacity to correct some excesses through anti-corruption campaigns and economic rebalancing efforts. As of 2021, China’s growth had begun to moderate (in the 5–6% range) as it reached upper-middle income status and faced structural challenges like an aging population. The question for the future is whether the one-party system that enabled China’s rapid rise can also navigate a transition to slower, high-quality growth without the feedback mechanisms of a democracy. So far, China’s authoritarian governance has proven adept at delivering growth and poverty reduction on a vast scale, though it required embracing market economics and global integration – a reminder that it was the economic liberalization, not the political repression, that truly powered the miracle.
Singapore: Stability, Investment, and Prosperity Under One Party
Singapore represents a case of “authoritarian lite” – a city-state long dominated by a single party – that achieved first-world prosperity through disciplined governance and integration with global markets. Upon independence in 1965, Singapore faced high unemployment, poverty, and a lack of natural resources. But under the paternalistic rule of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and the People’s Action Party (which has continuously been in power since), Singapore rapidly transformed. GDP growth averaged around 7% annually since independence, including an astonishing 9%+ average during the first quarter-century after 1965. This sustained growth, among the highest in the world over such a long period, lifted Singapore from a low-income port city to a high-income, highly industrialized economy. Today Singapore’s GDP per capita tops $84,000 (2023) – one of the highest in the world – and the nation ranks near the top of global indices for competitiveness and human capital. Living standards are correspondingly high: poverty rates are very low (extreme poverty is virtually zero); citizens enjoy modern housing, healthcare, and education; and the unemployment rate consistently hovers in the low single digits.
Singapore’s authoritarian aspects – strict curbs on press freedom, limited opposition politics – were paired with vehemently pro-business and technocratic economic management. The government fostered a business-friendly regulatory environment with strong rule of law, which attracted waves of foreign investment. Multinational corporations were enticed to set up manufacturing and later high-tech operations, benefiting from Singapore’s strategic location and educated English-speaking workforce. The state invested heavily in public education and skills training, contributing to Singapore now having the world’s highest Human Capital Index score (as of 2020). Crucially, although politics were tightly controlled, economic policy was pragmatic and market-driven – Singapore has consistently ranked near the top of the world in economic freedom (such as free trade, low corruption, and property rights protection). State-owned enterprises exist, but they are run like private companies and have to compete. The government also engaged in long-term planning, using five-year plans and industrial policy to climb the value chain from low-end textiles in the 1960s to electronics, petrochemicals, and financial services in subsequent decades.
One could argue that Singapore’s semi-authoritarian stability provided the predictability investors crave, without the upheavals that frequent changes in government might bring. For example, labor relations were managed through a corporatist model that avoided disruptive strikes, helping maintain a stable business climate. During regional crises – the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 or the global recession of 2008–09 – Singapore was able to respond decisively (e.g. dipping into accumulated reserves to stimulate the economy or retrain workers) due to its centralized authority and fiscal strength. As a result, the city-state quickly rebounded from downturns. On the other hand, critics note that Singapore’s success also owes much to factors not inherently tied to authoritarianism: its strategic trade location, the rule of law inherited and maintained from British institutions, and a culture of meritocratic civil service. Singapore also took care to build an uncorrupt government – leaders were paid high salaries and held to strict anti-graft standards, making Singapore today one of the least corrupt countries. This stands in contrast to many authoritarian regimes where corruption is rife. In sum, Singapore’s experience shows that a stable one-party dominant system can steer rapid economic growth and deliver high living standards – but it did so by embracing globalization, sound macroeconomic management, and the rule of law in commerce. The political repression in Singapore (while significant in terms of civil liberties) did not extend to heavy-handed interference in the economy; on the contrary, policy continuity and technocratic competence have been its hallmarks. This blurs the line between “authoritarian” and “democratic” capitalism – Singapore in many ways operates like a free-market democracy with constrained political competition. Regardless of labels, its track record of 7% long-term growth and successful crisis management stands as one of the clearest examples of authoritarian-linked prosperity.
Autocratic Foundations and Democratic Transitions
South Korea: Industrialization under Autocracy, Flourishing under Democracy
South Korea’s journey from poverty to prosperity spanned periods of harsh authoritarian rule followed by a successful transition to democracy – with each phase contributing to its economic trajectory. In the 1960s and 70s, under the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee, South Korea implemented a state-led development model that achieved spectacular growth. The government prioritized export-driven industrialization, nurtured large conglomerates (chaebols) like Samsung and Hyundai, and suppressed labor unrest – all hallmarks of an authoritarian approach to economic management. The payoff was striking: South Korea’s real GDP grew about 10% annually on average from 1962 to 1994, one of the fastest sustained growth rates ever recorded. In the 1950s, South Korea had been war-torn and as poor as many sub-Saharan African countries; by the early 1990s, it had industrialized and joined the ranks of upper-middle income nations. This period of authoritarian growth was fueled by extraordinary export performance (Korean exports rose approximately 20% in real terms) and investment rates above 30% of GDP. Key indicators of living standards improved accordingly: from 1970 to 1990, life expectancy jumped from around 56 to 71 years; literacy became nearly universal; and absolute poverty sharply declined as income per capita surged.
Authoritarian political control was instrumental in this early growth phase. Park’s regime (1961–1979) could single-mindedly channel resources into strategic industries (steel, shipbuilding, electronics) and enforce high savings rates, without bowing to populist pressures or interest group lobbying. The government directed credit to favored sectors and maintained artificially low interest rates and wages to boost industrial competitiveness. Independent unions were repressed, which kept labor costs down and attracted foreign buyers with cheap, reliable production – though of course at a human cost to Korean workers who lacked rights. The state could also embark on ambitious infrastructure projects (like the Seoul–Busan highway) on its own timetable. Notably, South Korea’s autocrats were relatively “developmentalist” – they legitimated their rule through economic performance rather than ideology alone, and many policies were guided by technocrats. This stands in contrast to more kleptocratic dictators; in Korea, corruption existed but was somewhat contained, and education was heavily promoted. By the 1980s, South Korea had a solid industrial base and a growing middle class, setting the stage for political change.
In 1987, South Koreans successfully pushed for democratization, ending decades of military rule. Rather than derail the economy, the advent of democracy coincided with continued growth and the maturation of the economy into a fully developed status. Democratic governance brought stronger labor rights and freer media, which led to higher wages and more attention to social issues – but South Korea retained a broadly pro-market, export-led approach under elected leaders. This helped the country navigate the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis: when faced with a severe financial meltdown, the democratic government (under President Kim Dae-jung) swiftly secured an IMF rescue and implemented painful reforms to restructure banks and chaebols. Though unemployment spiked and some conglomerates failed, Korea emerged from the crisis with a more robust, transparent financial system and soon returned to growth. By the late 1990s, South Korea had joined the OECD, and by the 2000s it had become a technology powerhouse, home to global brands and leading innovations. Today, its GDP per capita is about $35,000, and it is one of the highest among Asian democracies. The poverty rate is low (relative to global standards, though some inequality issues persist), and it has proven economically resilient – for instance, responding effectively to the 2008 crisis and the COVID-19 downturn.
South Korea’s story demonstrates that while authoritarian rule jump-started its economic engine, the transition to democracy did not hinder – and arguably helped – its long-term economic sustainability. The authoritarian era laid the industrial foundations and habits of high investment, but also bequeathed some problems (like powerful oligopolies and political corruption) that democratic reforms have gradually addressed. Under democracy, Korea has invested more in social welfare and innovation, moving from merely catching up to pushing the technological frontier (e.g. in semiconductors and 5G). In sum, South Korea exemplifies an “edge case” where an authoritarian growth spurt was real and significant, but the country ultimately achieved even greater prosperity and stability by embracing democracy and the rule of law. The political control of the earlier era was a double-edged sword – it enabled rapid industrialization, yet Koreans chose to abandon autocracy once a certain level of development was reached, suggesting that inclusive institutions were needed to sustain and share the gains of growth.
Portugal: From Estado Novo Autarky to European Union Integration
Portugal illustrates how a prolonged period of authoritarian rule yielded limited economic progress, while a subsequent democratic transition facilitated more robust development through European integration. Portugal was under the Estado Novo dictatorship from 1933 until 1974 – a corporatist authoritarian regime led by António de Oliveira Salazar (and later Marcelo Caetano). In the mid-20th century, Salazar’s conservative economic policies maintained financial stability but also contributed to economic stagnation. The regime was fiscally cautious (Salazar balanced budgets and paid down debt), but this came at the cost of underinvestment in education and industrial modernization. By 1960, Portugal was one of Western Europe’s poorest countries, largely rural and relatively isolated from the post-war boom that was occurring elsewhere on the continent.
In the 1960s, however, Portugal did experience an economic uptick even under dictatorship. The Estado Novo began limited economic liberalization, joining EFTA in 1960 and attracting some foreign capital. The result was a period often dubbed the “Portuguese Miracle”: from 1960 to 1973, Portugal’s GDP grew by approximately 6.9% per year , with industrial output rising by 9% annually as the country began exporting textiles, electronics, and plastics per year. Despite the strain of expensive colonial wars in Africa during this period, growth remained robust. This late boom significantly raised incomes – Portugal’s GDP per capita roughly doubled in the 1960s – and created new urban middle classes. By the early 1970s, modern highways and factories had appeared, and Portugal’s living standards were on the cusp of converging with the lower end of Western Europe. In short, the authoritarian regime laid foundational economic groundwork, including basic industry, infrastructure, and greater economic diversification than the agrarian structure dominant in the 1940s.
However, the lack of political freedoms meant that Portugal’s economy still lagged in dynamism and inclusiveness. Much of the new wealth remained concentrated among elites aligned with the regime. Social indicators such as education and health improved only gradually — in 1970, around one-quarter of the population remained illiterate, and access to modern healthcare was limited due to the regime's emphasis on control over social investment. Moreover, by the early 1970s, the costs of colonial wars and international isolation were catching up: inflation was rising and growth began to slow. In 1974, a left-leaning military coup (the Carnation Revolution) toppled the Estado Novo, ushering in democracy. The transition initially caused economic turmoil – with revolutionary fervor leading to nationalizations and a sharp drop in investment. GDP actually contracted in the mid-1970s amid strikes and capital flight. But by the 1980s, Portugal stabilized under a democratic government that embraced a market economy and oriented the country toward Europe. Portugal joined the European Community (now EU) in 1986, which proved to be an economic catalyst. Access to European markets and substantial EU development funds spurred modernization of infrastructure (roads, telecommunications) and an influx of foreign investment. The late 1980s and 1990s saw Portugal’s economy grow steadily (often 4-5% a year), and its GDP per capita rose from about 50% of the EU average at the time of accession to around 70-75% by the early 2000s. Poverty rates fell and many Portuguese experienced improvements in income and quality of life, catching up with their Western European neighbors.
Today, Portugal is a high-income democracy, fully integrated into the European single market and euro currency zone. It underwent hardships during the 2010–2014 Eurozone debt crisis – requiring an EU/IMF bailout and painful austerity – but emerged with reformed finances and returned to growth by the late 2010s. Portugal’s ability to recover was bolstered by the credibility and support it had as a democracy within the EU framework, support the previous dictatorship lacked. In reviewing Portugal’s economic history, it’s evident that the authoritarian Estado Novo provided a measure of stability and a late burst of growth in the 1960s, partially closing the gap with more developed countries. Yet it was the democratic era, with openness and institutional reforms, that solidified and expanded those gains. Political control under Salazar may have prevented worse outcomes (Portugal avoided the devastation of World War II, for instance, by remaining neutral and stable), but it also meant missed opportunities – Portugal adopted new technologies and business practices slower than it might have under a freer system. Ultimately, the shift to democracy and EU membership allowed Portugal to complete its transformation into a modern economy, suggesting that while authoritarianism can lay some groundwork, long-term prosperity was reached only with political liberalization and external partnership.
Conclusion
Across these varied cases, the relationship between authoritarian governance and economic performance is complex. Authoritarianism in itself is neither a guaranteed path to prosperity nor a sentence to poverty – much depends on the policies pursued, the quality of institutions (formal or informal), and how leaders respond to crises. On one hand, the failures of the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Venezuela highlight the potential pitfalls of unchecked power. In these instances, political control was used to entrench ideology or personal rule at the expense of sound economics: whether through impractical central planning, isolationist policies, rampant corruption, or unsustainable populist spending. Without the corrective mechanisms of democracy – free media, opposition, regular elections – policy mistakes often persisted until they wrought extensive damage. The result was sluggish growth or outright economic collapse, high inflation, and rising poverty, conditions that eventually threaten regime stability itself (as seen by the humanitarian crises and migration waves out of North Korea and Venezuela).
On the other hand, cases like China and Singapore demonstrate that an authoritarian state can foster rapid growth and development if it adopts market-friendly policies, invests in human capital, and maintains stability. These regimes have used their concentrated power to implement long-term economic plans, attract investment, and prevent internal disorder, yielding impressive gains in GDP and poverty reduction. However, it is crucial to note that their success hinged on embracing globalization and economic openness – strategies that align with orthodox development economics, not a unique feature of authoritarianism. The same outcomes (high growth, industrialization) were achieved by democratic East Asian states like South Korea and Japan, suggesting that it was effective policy, not the absence of democracy, that made the difference. Moreover, the “success stories” of authoritarian capitalism often come with caveats: environmental degradation in China, restrictions on freedoms in Singapore, or potential vulnerabilities from lack of accountability (for instance, China’s high local debts or Singapore’s reliance on a very small leadership circle).
The “edge cases” of South Korea and Portugal show a nuanced narrative: authoritarian periods can in some instances lay an economic foundation – by building infrastructure, basic industries, and education – but the transition to democracy allowed these societies to reach a more advanced and resilient stage of development. As the USSR demonstrated, dictatorships are good at directing capital investment into factories and businesses, but flounder when the economy approaches a technological frontier when research, development, and entrepreneurship is required. Democratic governance brought rule of law, transparency, and innovation-friendly environments that arguably helped sustain growth and handle shocks (like financial crises) more effectively in the long run, with countries at the technological frontier. In South Korea and Portugal, joining the community of democracies and rule-based international frameworks (OECD, EU) unlocked access to markets and capital that dictatorships struggled to obtain. In these stories, political liberalization and economic improvement went hand-in-hand over the long term.
In terms of investment inflows and business confidence, it appears that stable governance – whether democratic or authoritarian – is key. Investors seek predictability and rule of law. Authoritarian regimes that provided that (Singapore, China in its reform era) attracted massive investment, whereas those that didn’t (Venezuela’s expropriations, Russia’s legal insecurity, North Korea’s paranoia) saw capital flee. Notably, corruption often blooms under authoritarianism due to lack of oversight, which can severely undermine economic performance. Hungary’s slide in corruption rankings and Russia’s crony capitalism show how even mild autocracy can deter investment and growth over time. By contrast, Singapore’s clean governance and China’s recent anti-corruption drives show an awareness that without integrity, the economic engine can stall.
In conclusion, the economic consequences of authoritarian governance are not uniform – they range from spectacular growth to spectacular collapse. Authoritarianism can concentrate power to make rapid decisions, which helps when those decisions are prudent (as in building infrastructure or liberalizing trade), but hurts terribly when decisions are poor (as in printing money or shutting out the world). Democracies diffuse power and may deliberate more slowly, but they offer course-correction mechanisms and broader buy-in, often proving more sustainable for complex modern economies. Ultimately, the evidence suggests that accountable and inclusive institutions – hallmarks of democracy – tend to foster more consistent long-run economic development and resilience, whereas authoritarian regimes run the risk of extreme outcomes. Good governance, transparency, and sound economic policy matter more to GDP and human development than whether a government is elected or not. And as several of these cases illustrate, many nations that prosper under authoritarian spurts eventually demand political freedoms – seeking not just economic growth, but growth with voice and dignity. The challenge for those still under authoritarian rule is whether their leaders will adapt and deliver broad-based prosperity, or follow the path of those who learned too late that no amount of power can defy economic reality.
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